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Hunter: Ohio's Usury Law and Their Effect Upon the Home Mortgage Market

OHIO'S USURY LAWS AND THEIR EFFECT UPON
THE HOME MORTGAGE MARKET: ECONOMIC
AND CONSTITUTIONAL INEQUITIES
The parties to a bond, bill, promissory note or other instrument
of writing for the forebearance or payment of money at any
future time may stipulate thereon for the payment of interest
upon the amount thereof at any rate not exceeding eight per
cent per annum payable annually, except that any rate of
interest in excess of the maximum rate provided in this section
when the original amount of the principal indebtedness stipulated in the bond, bill, promissory note, or other instrument of
writing exceeds one hundred thousand dollars.'
0

IO'S USURY STATUTE, noted above, represents legislative regulation
setting the maximum annual interest charge legally assessable against
instruments evidencing a debt. The obvious purpose of such restrictive
legislation is to protect the capital borrower from paying more than a
specified rate of interest, adjudged and rendered malum prohibitum in
accordance with the moral outlook of the legislature.

The concept of usury regulation is a well settled principle in the
law,2 founded primarily upon the misguided perception of interest
limitations as efficient and necessary legislation promoting the popular
notion of consumer protection by cautiously supervising credit markets.
Endowed with a lengthy history, limitations precluding the usurious
assessment of interest charges have acquired a time-honored, almost
sacred position in the statutory scheme of Ohio, as well as other states. 3
This favored outlook toward usury laws is further bolstered by its
ill-founded appeal as legislation in the best interests of the borrower. As
a result, usury restrictions are often seen as traditional, protective
legislation. A more sophisticated analysis of usury regulation in Ohio
reveals that this is not the case.

I OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1343.01 (Page 1962), as amended (Supp. 1973). The above
section has been recently amended, effective September 30, 1974, to provide for the
exclusion of loans made by a broker or dealer registered under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended, from the operation of the usury laws. See Orno REv. CODE
ANN.
§ 1343.01 ( 166 Current Material Bulletin No. 4 1974).
2
See generally, e.g., Hershman, Usury and the Tight Mortgage Market, 22 Bus. LAw.
333, 334-36 (1967); Lowell, A Current Analysis of the Usury Laws--A National

View, 8 SAN DEEuo L. REv. 193, 194-95 (1971).
3 Currently, usury limitations by percent in the 50 states are generally as follows:
7.50--one state, 8.00-11 states, 8.50-two states, 9.00--six states, 10.00-16 states,
12.00--six states, 16.00-one state, 18.00--two states, 21.0--one state, no present
usury limitations-four states. (Various state interest rate ceilings also possess assorted
corporate and governmental exemptions as well as certain statutorily-exempt lenders.)
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ECONOMIC INEQUITY: FREE MARKET SYSTEM

v. LEGISLATIVE MORALITY
Capital, like other goods in the free market system, should be viewed
as a commodity subject to varying changes in supply and demand. Like
these other goods, the allocation of capital within our economic system
is determined by variations in the price of capital, or, the interest rate
charged for the use of these funds.
The prevailing interest rate on long-term capital is generally
considered to be the most influential short-run determinant of housing
market activity. Naturally enough, the demand for housing is inversely
proportional to the interest rate, or the cost of obtaining the necessary
funds to build or buy a home. And yet, the fluctuations of demand in
response to changes in the interest rate are not nearly as volatile as the
subsequent shifts in the supply of mortgage funds. The demand for
housing and mortgage credit has displayed a certain insensitivity to
changes in either housing costs or mortgage rates. The result has been
the evolution of a fairly inelastic demand curve for housing. On the other
hand, the supply of mortgage capital has revealed an extreme sensitivity
to short-run fluctuations in interest rates. The limited return on mortgage
investments, -the high cross-elasticity of demand by investors between
mortgages and various other debt instruments, and the volatile and
persistent credit demands of the corporate sector, have all contributed in4
making the supply curve for mortgage market capital relatively elastic.
Adding to these conditions, the usury ceiling in Ohio of 8% serves
to intensify the vigorous swings in the levels of mortgage capital available
to -the residential mortgage market. Crucial to an understanding of the
availability of capital in the home mortgage market is a recognition of
the underlying relationship between the prevailing mortgage rate and the
5
related capital yields in the aggregate money markets. Increases in
the prevailing market rate work to attract capital from the mortgage
market as well as exerting an upward pressure upon the mortgage market
rate. Conversely, a fall in the prevailing interest rate in the aggregate
money market serves to channel increased funds into the mortgage
market while exerting a downward influence upon the mortgage rate.
Unfortunately, Ohio's usury ceiling serves to distort the operation of the
6
free market system in adjusting to changing credit conditions. In times of
4See

M. W.

LEE, MACROECONOMICS: FLUCTUATIONS, GROWTH AND STABILITY, at 64

(1967). See also G. Break, The Sensitivity of Housing Demand to Changes in Mortgage Credit Terms, URBAN ANALYSIS READINGS IN HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

(Page and Seyfried ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Page and Seyfried].
5 W. W. Alberts, Business Cycles, Residential Construction Cycles, and the Mortgage
Market, in Page and Seyfried at 94-96.
6 See generally, e.g., Benfield, Money, Mortgages, and Migraine-The Usury Headache, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 819 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Benfield]; Stoddard
and Hoover, Eflect of Usury Laws on Home Ownership Needs, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
49 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Stoddard and Hoover].
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rising interest rates the increased yields of investment opportunities in the
corporate sector serve to attract capital from the mortgage market.
Naturally, the prevailing mortgage rate must move upward to remain
competitive with corporate yields and minimize the decrease in the
availability of mortgage market capital. However, when the investment
yield in the corporate sector exceeds the statutory ceiling upon the
mortgage lending rate (in Ohio: 8 % ), rate-sensitive capital sources direct
investment funds into the higher-yield corporate sector, or out-of-state
mortgage markets, and away from the suddenly uncompetitive local
mortgage market. The result is little or no supply of mortgage capital
within the regulated jurisdiction.
The usury regulation in Ohio is founded upon the honorable
objective of maintaining a maximum allowable interest charge upon
debt. Unfortunately the rationale of any such interest ceiling ignores the
realities of economics. 7 With a proper recognition of the fact that
the statutory regulation of Ohio's interest rate ceiling will have little or no
effect upon the prevailing interest rate in the corporate investment sector
as well as the mortgage rate of surrounding states,8 it would appear clear
that in periods of rising interest rates, the primary effect of Ohio's usury
ceiling is not to provide adequate mortgage capital at moderate rates to
Ohio home buyers, but to drive vast amounts of potential mortgage funds
into other investment opportunities affording a higher yield. 9 Indeed, in
times of high interest rates, unrealistic interest ceilings, such as OHIO
REVISED CODE section 1343.01, do not maintain adequate supplies of
mortgage capital at moderate rates, but, in actuality, block the flow
of funds into the mortgage market by preventing the mortgage rate from
rising to a level which is competitive with other investment opportunities.
A brief example will quickly reveal the faulty reasoning behind
market-distorting usury limitations. Suppose the Ohio legislature, in an
attempt to "protect the Ohio consumer" from suddenly rising gasoline
prices, set a statutory price ceiling on gasoline of 30 cents per gallon.
Certainly no consumer could object to the intent of such legislation:
gasoline at moderate prices. Nonetheless, the effect of such legislation
would clearly be different. Although all consumers could now afford
gasoline at the new bargain ceiling price, no gasoline would be supplied
in Ohio as oil firms would distribute their gasoline outside of the state
to obtain maximum total revenues." °
Mortgage rates, like gasoline prices, must by economic necessity fall
7p. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS, at 361-89 (7th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Samuelson].
8 Compare M. K. EvANs, Macroeconomic Activity (1969), with J. M. Guttentag, The
Short Cycle in Residential Construction, 1946-59, in Page and Seyfried at 83.

9 Id.
10 See Snook, Bankers Rally Behind Bill to Lift Home Loan Rate, Cleveland Plain
Dealer, February 26, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
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within parameters determined upon a national level, and cannot be
significantly influenced by interest-ceiling legislation of any single state.
The futility of any such attempts to legislate morality is curtly summarized
by Nobel prize-winning economist Paul Samuelson: "The cheap money
you can't get does you little good.""
Quite clearly, usury limitations and their unsuccessful attempts to
influence prevailing interest rates cannot be justified upon economic
grounds. 12 With -that point established, whether legislation-setting interest
rate ceilings should be retained turns upon a subjective determination as
to whether or not the social benefit of adequate (though more expensive)
supplies of mortgage capital in periods of high interest rates exceeds the
social detriment of permitting the creation of debt instruments at higher
rates.' 3 Of course, any answer to this question hinges greatly upon how
interest ceilings are perceived. The goal of usury statutes should be the
prevention of unconscionable transactions resulting in debt creation evidencing exorbitant interest rates. This is not the case when interest rate ceilings4
place an unwarranted economic burden upon the free flow of capital.'
CONSTITUTIONAL VULNERABILITY: EQUAL
PROTECTION DIFFICULTIES
Ohio's statutory scheme of interest rate ceilings is a complex and
disjointed collection of legislation.' 5 Although OHIo REVISED CODE section
1343.01 states the general usury regulation, its 8% limit on debt
instruments is subject to many statutory exceptions.
The Ohio Small Loan Law 16 authorizes a licensed lender to extend
credit in an amount not to exceed $2,000. Under this statutory provision,
any such licensed lender may charge a maximum of $16 per $100 per
year for the first $500 borrowed, $9 per $100 per year for the next
$500 borrowed, and $7 per $100 per year for the amount between $1,000
and $2,000 borrowed. These permissible "add-on" interest charges
11 Samuelson, supra note 7, at 378.
12 Id. at 375-78.
13 See Note, An Ounce of Discretion for a Pound of Flesh: A Suggested Reform for

Usury Laws, 65 YAs.E LJ. 105 (1955), for the discussion of an analogous balancing
test. See also, e.g., Merriman and Hanks, Revising State Usury Statutes in Light of a
Tight Money Market, 27 MD. L. REv. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Merriman and
Hanks]; Prather, Mortgage Loans and the Usury Laws, 16 Bus. LAw. 181 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Prather].
14 Compare Benfield, supra note 6, with Stoddard and Hoover, supra note 6.

15See OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 1343.01 (Page 1962), as amended (Supp. 1973)
(general usury provision). But see, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1107.27 (Page
1968) (Commercial Bank Revolving Credit Exemption); § 1151.21 (Page 1968)
(Building and Loan and Savings and Loan Exemption); § 1321.13 (Page 1962), as
amended (Supp. 1972) (Small Loan Exemption); § 1321.57 (Page Supp. 1973)

(Second Mortgage Loan Exemption); § 1321.79 (Page Supp. 1973) (Insurance
Premium Finance Company Exemption).
'eOmo REV. CODE Am. §§ 1321.01 et seq. (Page 1962), as amended (Supp, 1973).
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represent effective annual percentage rates as high as 28.32% -well

in

excess of section 1343.01 guidelines.17
Another statutory exception to Ohio's general usury provisions is the
Retail Installment Sales Law,18 where a retail seller may permissibly assess
a retail buyer "add-on" finance charges for credit sales which represent
effective annual percentage rates of nearly 16% per annum, as well as
additional contract service charges and delinquent charges.
Under the statutory provisions concerning second mortgage loans, 19
licensed second-mortgage lenders may charge 8% "add-on" interest
charges upon mortgage loans which are other than first liens upon
real property, not in excess of $15,000 in amount nor over 60 months
as to term. This permissible interest charge representing an effective
annual percentage rate of nearly 16% is but another statutory exception
to Ohio's general usury provision of 8% .20
In addition, the legislative provision for revolving credit extended
by commercial banksnl represents another statutory exemption to the
stated interest rate ceiling in Ohio. Permitted finance charges of 2% per
month on the first $200 of credit, 1V2 % per month on the second $200
of credit, and 1% per month on amounts over $400 equal effective
annual percentage rates well in excess of the 8% general limitation. 22
These statutory exemptions to Ohio's general usury provision would
seem sufficient in and of themselves to show that the legislative scheme of
interest rate regulation in Ohio lacks a rational basis. But there is more.
Perhaps the most significant exception to Ohio's general usury provision
is the statutory exemption to Building and Loan Associations and Savings
and Loan Associations. 23 Under these legislative guidelines, these privileged
business entities are permitted to invoke any interest charges on loans
24
made in any amount not in conflict with "its constitution and bylaws."
Moreover, such "assessments shall not be deemed usurious, although in
excess of the legal rate of interest. ' 25 The effect of the usury exemption
here is to permit Building and Loan Associations as well as Savings
and Loan Associations to make first mortgage loans upon realty
evidencing interest charges in excess of 8%, while the very same
17 Compare ORio Rav. CODE ANN. § 1343.01 (Page 1962), as amended (Supp. 1973),
with §§ 1321.01 et seq. (Page 1962), as amended (Supp. 1973).
18 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1317.01 et seq. (Page 1962), as amended (Supp. 1972).
19 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1321.51 et seq. (Page Supp. 1973).
2

o Compare OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1343.01 (Page 1962), as amended (Supp. 1973),
with OxIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1321.57 (Page Supp. 1973).
21 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1107.27 (Page 1968).
22
23

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01 (Page 1962), as amended (Supp. 1973).
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1151.21 (Page 1968).

24 Id.
2 13.
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transaction originated by any other commercially prudent yet non-exempt
lender is subject to the usury limitations of section 1343.01.
Legislative distinctions regarding permissible interest charges between
Building and Loans and Savings and Loans and other commercial
organizations whose regular business is originating, servicing, and
brokering real estate mortgage loans were based upon valid differences
many years ago.26 Founded upon the theory of a mutual, practically
fiduciary relationship between the Association-lender and the memberborrower, Building and Loan Association mortgages made exclusively
to Association members were considered radically different than loans
initiated by other commercial lenders:
We do not judge these associations by the operation and powers of
banking institutions. A member of -the former sustains a relation
of mutuality to each 'and all of the other members. If he becomes
a borrower, he is at the same time one of 'the lenders. In making a
loan it is not contemplated that the principal debt will be repaid in
bulk, but in installments of dues, interest, dividends, and perhaps
premiums. When these amount to the sum borrowed, the mortgage
is cancelled, the stock returned to the borrower, which he may hold
free of liens, or he may withdraw from the association under its
rules for that purpose. Therefore, the relation of debtor and creditor,
it may be said, does not strictly exist.2
While judicial reasoning of this sort may have been adequate to
explain the rationality of granting statutory exemption from usury
limitation to Building and Loan and Savings and Loan Associations many
years ago, the argument retains no persuasive vitality today, since
contemporary lending practices of Savings and Loans show that one need
28
not be a member to obtain a first mortgage loan from these institutions.
With what once was a tenuous distinction now at best inoperative,
Ohio's differing legislative treatment of contemporary Savings and Loan
Associations (and other commercial organizations who originate first
mortgage real estate transactions, such as commercial banks and mortgage
banking firms) would appear vulnerable to a constitutional attack based
upon the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.29
26The concept of mutuality present between Building and Loan Associations and
member-borrowers and absent in other creditor-debtor relationships was held sufficient
to justify the legislative distinction. See, e.g., Cramer v. Southern Ohio Loan & Trust
Co., 72 Ohio St. 395, 74 N.E., 200 (1905); Eversmann v. Schmitt, 53 Ohio St. 174, 41
N.E. 139 (1895); Lucas v. Greenville Bldg. and Say. Ass'n, 22 Ohio St. 339 (1872).
But see Mykrantz v. Glide Bldg. and Loan Ass'n, 19 Ohio C.C.R. 51, 10 Ohio C. Dec.
250 (1899).
27 Cramer v. Southern Ohio Loan & Trust Co., 72 Ohio St. 395, 408, 74 N.E. 200, 203
(1905).

28 OHio RaV. CoDE ANN. §§ 1151 et seq. (Page 1968) contain no such limitations,
and present lending practices indicate that association membership is no longer a
requisite to loan eligibility.
29 The fourteenth amendment of the United Stats Constitution states in pertinent
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While recognizing that there is a strong presumption favoring
the constitutionality of legislation challenged under the fourteenth
amendment,3 0 the guarantees of equal protection require that the legislation
under examination draw rational distinctions between classes. 31 In other
words, there must be a reasonable basis for the legislative classification
which subjects the residual pool of commercial mortgage lenders to the
general usury guidelines of section 1343.01 while leaving certain "special
interest" lenders, such as Savings and Loans, free from such restrictions
by virtue of specially enacted exempting legislation. Based upon these
constitutional requisites, it can be argued that there is no rational basis for
distinguishing between Building and Loan and Savings and Loan
Associations on the one hand and mortgage banking firms and commercial
banks on the other, given the fact that all of the foregoing types of
organizations engage in basically the same type of transactions and
under similar economic conditions.
There may be difficulty in transforming this constitutional objection
into a winning argument. The general tenor of judicial examination of
legislative enactments in the area of economics against the dictates
of equal protection has been one of extreme deference to legislative
judgment. 32 Indeed, recognition that the guarantees of Equal. Protection
"goes no further than invidious distcrimination"33 (emphasis added) may
well indicate that the imperfect legislative distinction between Savings
and Loan Associations and other mortgage lenders does not warrant
judicial intervention.
LEGISLATIVE REFORM: LIFTING THE
ECONOMIC BARRIERS
Several attempts are currently under way to alter the present usury
limits in Ohio.34 Contemporary legislation in this area would serve to
part: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." Could the same argument be made with regard to legislative-distinctions
between commercial banks and Savings and Loans concerning demand deposits?
Compare Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1101.01 (I) (Page 1968) and § 1107.06 (Page
1968) with §§ 1151.01 et seq. (Page 1968).
so United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
S1F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See generally, e.g.,
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 H.Rv. L. Rxv. 1065 (1969).
32 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical

Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
But see Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
33
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
34 During early 1973 S.B. 355, which was an attempt, in essence, to grant the same
exemption from the usury provisions to commercial banks and mortgage banking
firms as enjoyed by savings and loans, died in committee. H.B. 1133, an attempt to
extend usury exemption to other bona fide commercial mortgage lenders, was introduced in the Ohio House of Representatives by Rep. Tom Fries early in 1974. The
bill, which would repeal OHIo REvISED CODE § 1343.01, would render inapplicable 8%
usury limitations when "the instrument evidences a loan secured by a mortgage which
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eliminate the inadequate flow of funds into the home mortgage market by
extending the current usury exemptions enjoyed by several special lenders
to include several other bona fide mortgage lenders. These new lenders are
currently effectively precluded from significant mortgage market participation in periods where the prevailing mortgage rate exceeds 8 %, the current
usury ceiling in Ohio. It is also important to note that limited usury
exemption and disintermediation in periods of high interest rates also
burden the prospective home buyer. As one of the Ohio sponsors of
remedial legislation in this area concludes, "Due to the exemption of Ohio's
Building and Loan and Saving and Loan institutions under Ohio's present
usury statute, the average income recipient is virtually shut out of the
35
The
home buying market during periods of inflated interest rates."
underlying purpose of such remedial legislation is to minimize the current
tendency for sizeable swings in the availability of mortgage capital
resulting from short-run fluctuations in credit conditions.
Proposed legislation 3 6 presently under consideration before the Ohio
House of Representatives would extend the current statutory exemption
to usury limitation enjoyed by several privileged commercial lenders to
commercial bankers as well as "mortgage bankers, or insurance company
' ' 37
when the debt instrument
authorized to do business in this state,
"evidences a first lien upon real property." The soundness of this proposal
rests upon several grounds.
First, the present usury limitations in Ohio do not protect the
consumer-they serve to affect him adversely. State interest rate
limitations have little or no effect upon regulating the prevailing market
rate for mortgages, which is determined on a national basis. Consequently,
OIo REVISED CODE section 1343.01 only discourages lender participation
in Ohio during periods of high interest rates as the Ohio consumer is
prevented by law from paying the market price necessary to borrow the
money. In actuality, the current usury scheme makes the cost of home
loans even more expensive as exempted lenders enjoy a virtual monopoly
of the home loan mortgage market and are free to dictate terms to the
38
borrower when the prevailing market rate exceeds the 8% usury ceiling.
Secondly, statutory exemptions to interest rate limitations should
be predicated on the character of the loan as well as the character of
the lender.3 9 Any past distinction justifying the differing legislative
...is

a first lien upon real property and the lender is (a commercial bank, a savings

and loan association) a mortgage banker, or an insurance company authorized to do

business in this state." This bill is currently under consideration in the Ohio House.
35 Letter from Rep. Tom Fries to author, March 11, 1974.
36H.B. 1133.
37 id.
38
Omo REv. CODE ANN.§ 1343.01 (Page 1962), as amended (Supp. 1973).
39 See cases cited note 26 supra for the judicial view in older cases. This announced
distinction may no longer be valid,
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treatment between savings and loans and established, bona fide, mortgage
lenders would appear to lack any present vitality. Certainly, any distinction
between these lenders is arguably insignificant since the mortgage
transaction offered by them is identical.
Thirdly, the existing operation of the present usury scheme is unfair
and discriminatory. As originally enacted, OHio REVISED CODE section
1343.01 was fair and equitable because it was applied equally to all
lenders without affording special treatment to any select lender or group
of lenders. However, the current usury scheme in Ohio is so riddled
with statutory exemptions40 that it now is indeed highly questionable
whether the inclusion or exclusion of various commercial lenders in
the special exempting provisions can properly be considered as sound
and reasonable. The net effect of the exemptions is to single out and
except from special treatment state banks and mortgage companies
and their various mortgage activities while affording other institutions
and/or transactions special treatment.
All of these reasons behind increasing the present exemptions to
Ohio's usury scheme would also promote the overall purpose of providing
greater stability in supply of mortgage capital as well as -the private
residential housing market in general.
These are honorable legislative goals. First of all, an element of
long-range housing continuity would encourage the development of stable
construction organizations with greater continuity of experience. Added
stability would further work to induce increased research in design,
construction methods, and materials that could greatly benefit the somewhat tenuous housing industry. Large investments in housing equipment
is another capital outlay that the tenuous housing industry could benefit
from. Housing stability would increase capital investment in the industry,
4
thus speeding up the mechanization of construction operations. '
Secondly, by removing the fear of serious depression within the
housing sector, the scramble for higher wages and higher profits during
boom periods would be lessened. A degree of steadiness and continued
employment within the housing market would help reduce the hyperinflationary wage and price increases characteristic of a cyclical and
inconsistent market. As a result, the cost of construction may well be
lowered ('the continuity of housing exerting a downward pressure on
4

oSee, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1107.27 (Page 1968) (Commercial Bank

Revolving Credit Exemption); § 1151.21 (Page 1968) (Building and Loan and Savings
and Loan Exemption); § 1317.06 (Page 1962) (Retail Installment Sales Exemption);
§ 1321.13 (Page 1962), as amended (Supp. 1973) (Small Loan Exemption); §
1321.57 (Page Supp. 1973) (Second Mortgage Loan Exemption); § 1321.79 (Page
Supp. 1973) (Insurance Premium Finance Company Exemption).
41See, e.g., M. L. COLEAN AND R. NEWCOMB, STABILIZING CONSTRUCTION: THE
RECORD AND THE POTENTIAL (1952); P. F. WENDT, HOUSING POLICY-THE SEARCH
FOR SOLUTIONS (1963).
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prevailing labor wages and supply prices) thus facilitating a gradually
broadened effective demand for residential construction. As a consequence,
the private residential housing market would serve as a stabilizing
influence upon the economy as a whole (with special reference to the
savings-investment dilemma accentuated currently when the prevailing
market rate exceeds the legally permissible rate), as the intensification
added by construction movements to general economic fluctuations
would be eliminated. 42
All in all, a continuous flow of mortgage capital and its accompanying
stabilizing effects upon residential construction would serve to induce
greater capital investments and work to put homebuilding on a larger
and more efficient scale offering significant economies. 43
CONCLUSION

The current legislative scheme of interest rate regulations in Ohio is
badly in need of a fundamental overhaul. The general usury provision set
forth in Omo REVISED CODE section 1343.01 has been so severely riddled
with exceptions" to allow for a greater availability of capital in certain
economic sectors, provided by certain exempt lenders, that the overall
effect of usury limitations in Ohio is so uneven as to raise severe
constitutional questions founded upon the Equal Protection Clause of the
fourteenth amendment. And although convincing, it is at least uncertain
whether this alleged constitutional infirmity would be sufficient in and
of itself to induce the judiciary to depart from its overriding policy of
deferring to legislative judgment in economic areas. 45
Remedial legislation is the answer not only in terminating the unequal
treatment currently afforded commercial lenders, but also in assuring the
uninhibited supply of mortgage capital in Ohio. Certainly, any sophisticated determination as to precisely where the usury limitation in Ohio
should be must be the product of a variety of economic inputs clearly
beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, at least one conclusion
is unavoidable: the present grossly inhibitory ceiling of 8% cannot be
justified. By recognizing that usury rates should be intended to set the
outside limit for conscionable transactions and not to impose marketdisrupting interest rate restrictions which serve to distort the free operation
of the real estate mortgage market, the Ohio legislature should move to
set interest rate ceilings at a level precluding unconscionable credit transactions while assuring that natural fluctuations of the general mortgage
rate will not impair the flow of funds into Ohio's home mortgage market.
DAVID M. HUNTER
42 Id.
43 Id.

44 See statutory provisions cited note 40 supra.
4
5See cases cited note 32 supra.
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